Contents

Glossary

LAM SON 719
by Maj. Gen. Nguyen Duy Hinh

Preface

For several years, the eastern part of the Laotian panhandle was used by North Vietnam as a corridor for the infiltration of personnel and materiels required to sustain its war efforts in South Vietnam and Cambodia. In addition to the Ho chi Minh Trail, the eastern panhandle contained many logistic installations and base areas. After the 18 March 1970 change of government in Cambodia which closed the port of Sihanoukville to the enemy, this trail-base area complex in lower Laos became even more important to North Vietnam in its prosecution of the war in the South. The real hub of this entire complex, where transportation and storage activities were coordinated, was Base Area 604 located west of the Demilitarized Zone and surrounding the district town of Tchepone.

To disrupt the flow of enemy personnel and supplies into South Vietnam, a ground attack was launched across the Laotian border against this enemy hub of activity on 8 February 1971. Operation LAM SON 719 was conducted by I Corps with substantial U.S. support in firepower and helilift but without the participation of U.S. advisers with those ARVN units fighting in Laos. As a test of Vietnamization, this operation was to demonstrate also the progress achieved in combat effectiveness by the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces. Further, LAM SON 719 achieved the objective of forestalling a Communist offensive in the spring of 1971.

This monograph will present a critical analysis of all aspects of LAM SON 719 from the planning stage to the withdrawal from lower Laos. In its preparation, I have drawn primarily from my own experience as an ARVN infantry division commander and from interviews with Vietnamese unit commanders and staff officers who participated in the operation. My work would not have been complete without the valuable contributions of several associates to whom I owe a special debt of gratitude.

General Cao Van Vien, Chairman of the Joint General Staff, RVNAF, has provided me with a unique insight into LAM SON 719 from the highest level of our armed forces. Lieutenant General Dong Van Khuyen, who was Commander of the Central Logistics Command, RVAAF at the time, has contributed his account of combined logistic support for the operation. Lieutenant General Ngo Quang Truong, Commander of IV Corps and later I Corps, under whose command and leadership I had served for several years, has enlightened me with his highly professional and analytical comments on tactical problems concerning the ARVN and especially the 1st Infantry Division. Brigadier General Tran Dinh Tho, Assistant Chief of Staff J-3, JGS, has briefed me in detail concerning his personal involvement in the early planning stage of the operation. Colonel Hoang Ngoc Lung, Assistant Chief of Staff J-2, JGS, has been of great assistance with his intimate knowledge of NVA forces, their activities on the Ho Chi Minh Trail and the enemy logistic structure in the area of operation.

Finally, I am particularly indebted to Lieutenant Colonel Chu Xuan Vien and Ms. Pham Thi Bong. Lt. Colonel Vien, the last Army Attaché serving at the Vietnamese Embassy in Washington, D.C., has done a highly professional job of translating and editing that helps impart unity and cohesiveness to the manuscript. Ms. Bong, a former Captain in the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces and also a former member of the Vietnamese Embassy staff, spent long hours typing, editing and in the administrative preparation of my manuscript in final form.

McLean, Virginia                                Nguyen Duy Hinh
31 July 1977                                    Major General, ARVN

Contents

Chapter

Page

˜ INTRODUCTION

1

II. THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT	9
The Ho Chi Minh frail System	9
Enemy Situation in Northern Military Region 1	19
Enemy Situation in the Laos Panhandle	21
The Area of Operation	25

II˜ THE PLANNING PHASE	32
How It All Started	32
The Basic Operational Plan	35
Division Planning and Preparations	40
U.S. Support	43
Solving Logistic Problems	47
Observations	53

IV. THE OFFENSIVE PHASE	58
Preparing to Cross the Border	58
Securing Ban Dong	65
The Enemy Counteracted	75
The Loss of Fire Support Base 31	81
Tchepone Was the Objective	88

V. THE WITHDRAWAL PHASE	98
The Disengagement	98
The Valiant ARVN 1st Infantry Division	104
"Lock Its Head Grip Its Tail"	108
Black Panther Raids	121

VI. A CRITICAL ANALYSIS	126
The Balance Sheet of LAMSON 719	126
United States Combat Suppport	133
Observations and Evaluation	140
Lessons Learned	156

VI˜ OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

164

Appendix	172
A. TASK ORGANIZATION, ARVN I CORPS, FOR LAM SOM 719	172
B. TASK ORGANIZATION, U.S. XXIV CORPS, FOR LAM SON 719	175

GLOSSARY

178

Tables

N÷	Tables	Page
1	GVN Released Results for LAM SON 719	128
2	LAM SON 719 Cumulative Casualties	129
3	Major Items of Equipment Lost or Destroyed	130
4	Enemy Casualties, LAM SON 719	131
5	Enemy Equipment Losses	132
6	LAM SON 719: U.S. Army Aviation Support Sorties	134
7	U.S. Army Aircraft Damaged and Destroyed	135
8	U.S. Air Force Tactical Air Support	135
9	Bomb Damage Assessment, U.S. Tactical Air	136
10	B-52 "Arc Light" Operation Summary, LAM SON 719	137
11	BDA Results on 55 Arc Light Targets	138
12	U.S. and ARVN Artillery Support	139

Charts

N÷	Charts	Page
1	Task Organization, LAM SON 719, Early February 1971	41
2	U.S. Army Aviation Task Organization	46

Maps

N÷	Maps	Page
1	The Ho Chi Minh Trail	11
2	The Trail System, Lower Laos, 1970	13
3	The Border Area, Military Regions 1 & 2	14
4	The Logistical Area of Tchepone	17
5	Enemy Deployment, Northern MR 1	20
6	Laos and North Vietnam	22
7	Enemy Disposition, Early February 1971	23
8	The Area of Operation	26
9	The Main Trail System and Base Areas	29
10	Operation Plan, Phase I (Dewey Canyon II)	37
11	Operation Plan, Phase II	38
12	U.S. Army Logistics Plan, LAM SON 719	49
13	ARVN Logistics Plan, LAM SON 719	50
14	Integrated Transportation System, LAM SON 719	52
15	The Attack Toward Khe Sanh	59
16	Consolidation of the Assembly Area	62
17	The Advance to Ban Dong	66
18	Enemy Situation, Last Week of February 1971	78
19	Attack of FSB 31	83
20	The Attack Toward Tchepone	94
21	Friendly Operations, Early March 1971	105
22	Enemy Situation, Late March 1971	112
23	Raids Across The Border	123

Note about page numbers: Page numbers are provided the same way as in the original book to facilitate the citing of the document in the same fashion as one might have done from the original book.

Some of the page numbers skip because of the maps and pictures in the original book. However the book in this electronic form is complete.